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that we are really making progress in this direction ; that we have not only abolished slavery and the political distinctions founded thereon, but are steadily advancing towards emancipation from the most hideous forms and consequences of the pauperism that everywhere replaces slavery when first abolished.

F. B. SANBORN.

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ART. VI. — *The History of the Norman Conquest of England, its Causes and its Results.* By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, M. A., late Fellow of Trinity College. Oxford : At the Clarendon Press. 8vo.

Vol. I. *The Preliminary History to the Election of Edward the Confessor.* pp. 650. 1867.

Vol. II. *The Reign of Edward the Confessor.* pp. 651. 1868.

Vol. III. *The Reign of Harold and the Interregnum.* pp. 768. 1869.

MR. E. A. FREEMAN has abandoned for a while the work in which he won his first laurels, has left unfinished his History of Federal Government, and commenced a history of the conquest of England by the Normans, three volumes of which are now before the public. This change in his field of labor is only temporary, he assures us ; indeed, it would not be strange if the studies which have interrupted his first enterprise, were after all preparatory to its continuation. When he had completed his view of federalism in ancient times, and came to the discussion of modern federal institutions, he found the feudal system demanding primary attention ; and a comparative view of the Teutonic and Romance nations, with the elements that they respectively contributed to feudalism, would find its most remarkable and instructive moment in that great event which of a sudden brought a fully developed Germanic nation within the range of imperial and feudal ideas. However this may be, we meet with more than one intimation that our author, as he proceeds with his present task, is gathering and collating materials for the one which has been temporarily sus-

pendent ; and the wide range of studies requisite for that work gives many an acceptable illustration or argument to this.

The three volumes already published bring the history down to the coronation of William I. at Westminster, on Christmas day, 1066. We are promised two more volumes, which are to treat of the immediate and the more distant results of the conquest ; one, that is, to contain the reign of William, and the other to trace the history in a general way down to the time of Edward I. These two volumes will thus correspond to the two introductory volumes, of which the first gives a general sketch of English history down to the accession of Edward the Confessor, while the second is devoted to the reign of this king, and the third treats solely of the events of the year 1066, together with the affairs of Normandy which bear directly upon them. Thus the book is in reality a history of England from early times ; the earliest period treated cursorily indeed, but with such freshness, vigor, and perspicuity that it may fully take the place of a much more detailed work. Of all Mr. Freeman's high qualities as an historian,—and they are many,—we are most impressed by his power of giving life to the times of which he treats. He grasps the essential points, those which will tell most strongly upon the mind of a reader of the nineteenth century ; and in especial gives us a view of international life and relations which is of the highest value. In these three volumes we find the civil and ecclesiastical history of England and of Normandy admirably given ; and wherever a contemporaneous event will throw light upon his subject, it is made to do service.

In his chapter upon the ancient English constitution Mr. Freeman disclaims all credit for originality, such as he believes he is entitled to in the narrative part of the history. Nevertheless, we cannot but think that even if his views of the constitution itself are learned from Mr. Kemble and Sir Francis Palgrave, he yet deserves the credit for what has been to us the most striking and instructive feature of the book, what we may call its *comparative* character, its treatment of early English institutions in the light of those of other Teutonic nations, and of even more distant kindred. “The early history of the Teuton,” he says (Vol. I. p. 76), “is con-

stantly illustrated by the early history of his Aryan kinsmen, and the living picture of the old Achæians of Homer brings vividly before us many an institution of our own forefathers and many an incident of their early history."

In these contributions to what has been termed Comparative Jurisprudence, — a younger and as yet scarcely recognized sister of Comparative Philology, — Mr. Freeman has done good service to his readers. Even if the views themselves are not new, they are so combined and so put as to have all the freshness of novelty; and it is this class of inquiries which is now leading every year to richer results, as the studies of historians are directed to points of a more and more fundamental nature. Mr. Maine says of the historians of former generations, that, "when they turned their attention to archaic states of society which exhibited much superficial difference from their own, they uniformly ceased to observe and began guessing. The mistake which they committed is therefore analogous to the error of one who, in investigating the laws of the material universe, should commence by contemplating the existing physical world as a whole, instead of beginning with the particles which are its simplest ingredients."\* Historians of the present day, following the lead of the philologists, have begun to study society and institutions at the foundation, by analyzing and comparing the varied elements of primeval times, together with the forms which they assume in early history; and in this work Mr. Freeman is a diligent and successful laborer.

We are yet far from possessing the data for a complete comparison of primeval institutions, and we are in danger of taking chance resemblances or analogies arising from a similarity of circumstances as evidence of an identity of origin. The inquirer is puzzled by the variety of form which the same primitive institutions may assume in different communities; baffled, too, by the impossibility of determining in all cases when two nations widely separated in time and space may be considered as standing at the same point of development. Thus, in regard to the Romans, whose early institutions are better known than those of almost any nation, Mommsen shows that, in legal institutions and customs, "fewer traces comparatively of the

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\* Ancient Law, p. 115.

primitive state of things have been preserved in the case of the Italians, and of the Romans in particular, than in the case of any other Indo-Germanic race. . . . In this respect, Italian history begins at a far later stage of civilization than e. g. the Greek or the Germanic, and from the first it exhibits a comparatively modern character.”\* But while Roman society in general possesses this comparatively modern character, its political institutions, on the other hand, preserve features of the primitive patriarchal system in a higher degree and for a longer time than either the Greek or the Germanic ; so that while from one point of view Roman civilization is modern in character, in another it retains elements of the greatest antiquity. For this reason, as well as because of the greater certainty and fullness of Roman tradition, the same author pronounces early Roman society to be the best point of departure for the study of comparative jurisprudence.

It is, indeed, chiefly from the examination of Roman and Indian antiquities that Mr. Maine has shown the patriarchal order of society to be the primitive one, so far back, at least, as we can trace the history of law. “The history of political ideas begins with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions ; nor is there any of those subversions of feeling which we term emphatically revolutions, so startling and so complete as the change which is accomplished when some other principle — such as that, for instance, of local contiguity — establishes itself for the first time as the basis of common political action.”† Now the Roman commonwealth underwent this revolution in historical times, when the plebeians wrested from the patricians an equal share in the government of their common state. In Athens, on the other hand, it is true that the patriarchal constitution was not formally set aside until the time of Solon, and not wholly even then ; still the ease with which the change was effected, as well as the significant fact that their *γένη* were distinctly recognized as artificial bodies, while the corresponding Latin *gentes* were assumed to be outgrowths of the family, proves that the territorial principle had practically superseded the patriarchal long before. It is a curious

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\* History of Rome, Vol. I. p. 202.

† Ancient Law, p. 124.

fact that of the three Aryan races of Northern Europe, the Celts and Slavonians have preserved a large share of patriarchal institutions, while among the Teutons we find few traces of them.

Cæsar, to be sure (VI. 22), tells of a custom among the Germans very similar to the community in land of the Russian villages described by Mr. Maine; but he seems to know nothing of any sentiment of consanguinity as connected with the custom, and it would appear that the custom itself had gone into disuse before the time of Tacitus, who does not allude to it. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the *mark*, or whit of territory of the primitive Teutonic community, was identical in its nature with the *pagus* of the early Italians; and the *pagus* was in its origin the *family domain*, as is shown by the fact pointed out by Mommsen, that all the earliest local tribes (which were founded upon these *pagi*) bore the names of patrician clans, — Claudia, Æmilia, Fabia, Cornelia, etc. It would appear probable, then, that the cantonal organization, *Gauverfassung*, was common to both Italians and Germans, and was in both cases the outgrowth of original patriarchal institutions. This view of the family origin of the early Germanic institutions is further substantiated by the derivation of the word *king*, given by both Mr. Freeman and Max Müller, as “connected with the word *cyn* or *kin* (not with *kennen* or *können*). The king is the representative of the race, the embodiment of its national being, the child of his people, and not their father.” (Vol. I. p. 82.) So we find, kings not of England, but of the English; just as in ancient times there was a king of the Lacedæmonians rather than of Lacedæmon.

Apart from the patriarchal character of early institutions, of which we find so meagre traces among Germanic peoples, there are one or two other points of analogy to classical institutions which may be mentioned here. The first is the elaborate political organism which is so characteristic of the Greeks and Romans, but so foreign to our notions at the present day. “All the nations of antiquity,” says Niebuhr, “lived in fixed forms, and their political associations were organized, down to the lowest ranks.” The complicated organization of the Roman state (in the “classes” and “centuries,” for in-

stance) is familiar; the English divisions of *tithing* and *hundred* are of a similar numerical nature, and were, no doubt, originally applied to a definite number of families, just as we are told was the case with the Athenian γένος. But this artificial style of organism soon passed out of use in England, while in Rome the public assemblies continued to the end to be organized in artificial subdivisions.

Another interesting point of resemblance between Roman and Teutonic institutions, and one upon which our views of the latter largely depend, is the division of the people into two classes, — *eorls* and *ceorls* in England, corresponding to patricians and plebeians in Rome. Mr. Freeman says that these English distinctions are older than historical records; the same is true, in fact, in regard to the Roman divisions, even if the negative name *plebeian* is of later origin. All we can do, therefore, is to point out the analogy, and the probability that the inferior class had the same origin in each case, whatever that origin may have been. The practice of *commendation*, too, by which each *ceorl* was required, or at least expected, to attach himself to some noble, is the same in character with the Roman relation of clientship. But the client (*listener*) or dependant was a member of the earliest Roman society with which we are acquainted; that is, the primitive division in Rome was not merely into nobles and commonalty, but every member of the commonalty sustained a personal relation of dependence upon some patrician clan; while *commendation* appears to have been at first a purely voluntary relation, coming up in historical times, and only by degrees developed into a kind of servitude.

This question of the origin and necessity of commendation is closely connected with a larger one, which involves the fundamental character of Teutonic liberties. Mr. Freeman is a firm believer in these liberties, finding his evidence partly in the study of the earliest English institutions themselves, partly in that comparison of primeval institutions which we have already spoken of. In his view, the *ceorl* was no less a member of the English commonwealth than the *eorl*; naturally, then, he was not originally obliged to “commend” himself. This was at first a purely voluntary and mutually advan-

tageous act. Those writers, on the other hand, who take a more aristocratic view of early institutions, and consider the ceorls as an essentially inferior class, would look upon "commendation" as their original and necessary condition. The Roman plebeiate is of course an argument for the latter view. Mr. Freeman thinks that he finds nearer and more potent analogies for the primitive liberty of the ceorls, in the heroic age in Greece, and especially in the prevailing usages of other Teutonic nations.

This general view has its bearings upon every portion of the English constitution ; but the most important single question upon which it bears is that of the constitution of the Witenagemót. It has always been admitted that no positive data existed to decide who had a right to be members of this body ; it could, therefore, only be a matter of inference from the general character of the institutions, and the views held by different writers have been determined by their conception of this general character. Mr. Freeman, therefore, in consistency with his prevailing habits of thought, boldly adopts the view, which Mr. Hallam says "has long since been victoriously refuted," that even the ceorls had the right to attend the Gemóts, both of nation and shire ; and finds support for his view in the analogies of the Homeric *Agora* and the public assemblies of the forest cantons of Switzerland. Indeed, even so late as the Arcadian Confederacy, established by Epaminondas, Mr. Grote says that "probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent communities had the right of attending" the general assemblies held at Megalopolis." But then Mr. Grote, like Mr. Freeman, has a strong attraction towards the popular side of discussions of this nature ; and as he gives no authority for this statement, and we have been able to find no direct testimony in ancient writers, we must assume that he, like Mr. Freeman, adopts this view from its agreement with his general understanding of Greek political institutions. At any rate, the ceorl was a citizen, not a slave.

However it may be with this particular point, it may fairly be claimed that all parts of the early English constitution are consistent with this view. The old controversy upon the distinction of *folcland* and *bocland* has, as is well known, been



settled upon this basis, that the *folcland* was the national domain, the undivided property of the people, while *bocland* was that portion of this land which was given out by deed, *boc*, to individuals ; it was a significant result of the Norman conquest, an indication of the changed relation of king and people, that the *folcland*, the national domain, now became royal domain, just as the king by degrees was transformed from elective head of the nation to its absolute lord.

The nature of the Anglo-Saxon kingship is another point which harmonizes completely with Mr. Freeman's general view of the constitution ; for he proves conclusively, what few now are disposed to deny, the purely elective character of the monarchy. The Witenagemót is shown to have possessed full power to elect a king, and even to depose him, — an act performed in the case of Sigebert of Wessex in 755, and apparently in that of Ethelred the Unready, and afterwards by the Parliament in the case of Edward II. and Richard II. This elective nature of the monarchy is of course of decisive importance in the Norman conquest. If Harold was lawful king by election, William could have no claim either by descent or bequest. To be sure, it was understood that the election was always to be made from the family of Cerdic, if a suitable member of that family existed ; but Cnut was none the less a legitimate king, and William the Norman (who, for the matter of that, was no descendant of Cerdic) was careful to confirm his worthless title by a formal election. An elective monarchy, indeed, is pretty sure to fall into the hands of a family, and so become practically hereditary ; as the German Empire, under the various lines, descended in nearly every case from father to son, as long as a direct transmission was possible, and then was transferred to some collateral branch. Thus Conrad III., founder of the Suabian house, was nephew of Henry V., the last Franconian emperor ; and when the Luxemburg line became extinct with Sigismond, his son-in-law, Albert II. of Austria, succeeded. Even Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland, the kingdoms which longest remained elective in form, rarely raised a Matthias Corvinus, George Podiebrad, or John Sobieski to the throne ; but the Piast line of Poland, the Angevin line of Hungary, and the Luxemburg line of Bohemia continued to reign until even

an heiress was able in each case to transfer her claim to her husband or son. Harold was as legitimate a king of England as Sobieski was of Poland. As Mr. Freeman says, "If Harold, Stephen, John, were usurpers, Aelfred and Eadward the Confessor were usurpers just as much," because neither of these was lawful heir, according to the modern rules of inheritance. And seeing that Edward the Confessor was present in England, while Edward the Outlaw was absent in Hungary, "to search over the world for the son of an elder brother, while the younger brother was close at hand, was an idea which would never have entered the mind of any Englishman of the eleventh century."

These rules of inheritance, we must remember, were created by the feudal system, and transferred from this to royalty. The royal office was at first strictly elective, under the modern European order of things, even if generally confined to one family; and when confined to one family, the choice was made from among its members, in such a way as to give the nation the best ruler practicable, — a mature Edred rather than a boy Edgar or Edwy. But inheritance was an essential feature of feudality, and must of course develop its principles and adhere to its rules of inheritance. Thus, though a son succeeded in preference to a daughter, yet even a daughter would succeed where there was no son. Of course in an elective monarchy females could not succeed, for the first object must be to secure the best *man*, to lead its armies and administer its concerns. Therefore when the feudal rules of inheritance were applied to the crown, France made an exception in this respect, and excluded females from the succession; while England adopted them in full, and counts an Elizabeth and Victoria with her Henrys and Georges.

The English liberties, — the English constitution as a pure and fully developed type of original Teutonic institutions, — this is the central idea of Mr. Freeman's history. England was eminently a free country, governed by the English people for themselves. They chose their own kings, made their own laws, controlled their own church. Nor did this constitution sacrifice order and prosperity to liberty. While the people of the Continent were overwhelmed by the calamities of that most calami-

tous age, the later Carolingian period,\* England was at a height of glory and renown which no other nation could parallel. Under Edward the Elder, Athelstane, Edmund, Edred, and Edgar, England was the foremost nation of Europe; not highly civilized as we reckon civilization now, but for Europe in the tenth century pre-eminently peaceful, powerful, and enlightened. We are wrong, then, when we make English liberties begin with Magna Charta, just as we are wrong when we make English history begin with William the Conqueror. Before Magna Charta was signed, there were traditions and sentiments and institutions surviving from the Anglo-Saxon times, which formed so sure a foundation for the new liberties, that these could never again be lost; while the popular rights which were won upon the Continent in the fourteenth century, and which seemed as vigorous and promising as these, were at once undermined and destroyed by the monarchs in their day of triumph. From the earliest ages, the English, beyond all other people, have possessed the *political sense*, derived from the enjoyment of actual political rights; and to this they owe their superior freedom. The early constitution was, to be sure, overthrown by the Norman and Angevin kings; but under John and Henry III. "the old English liberties are won back in another form, and the modern constitution of England begins."

This important point is well illustrated by Mr. Freeman. Thus, at the death of Cnut, when Harold I. and Harthacnut were rival candidates for the throne: "There was perhaps in that age no country except England in which such a question could have been decided, except at cost of a civil war. But the firmly rooted principles of English law, the habit of constant meeting and discussion, had, even in that age, produced some germs of the feeling to which the great English historian of Greece has given the name of 'constitutional morality.' The controversy was a sharp one, but it was decided, not on the field of battle, but in the debates of the Witenagemót." (p. 538.) Again, of Earl Godwine (Vol. II. p. 35): "The importance attributed to his oratory, the fluctuations of success

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\* A striking illustration of the miseries of this age is the fact that in the year 1000 the city of Worms, on the Rhine, lay in ruins, plundered, indeed destroyed, by Normans from the West (probably not those of Normandy) and Hungarians from the East.

and defeat which he underwent in the great deliberative Assembly, show clearly how advanced our constitution already was in an age when free debate was so well understood, and when free speech was so powerful."

England, then, in the eleventh century, was distinguished from the leading states of the Continent by the fact of its still retaining unmixed its Teutonic nationality and its free Teutonic constitution. The Scandinavian states were like England in this ; but then they were but just emerging from barbarism, anarchy, and heathenism, while England ranked with France and Italy in power and civilization. Germany, again, was purely Teutonic in nationality, but not in institutions ; for she had borrowed the feudal system from France, and imperialism from Italy. But it was not in the order of things that England should remain in this isolation ; the Norman conquest rudely broke it up, and brought England into the family of feudal nations. The essential difference, therefore, between the growth of English civilization and that of the nations of the Continent is, that the two great elements of modern society—the barbarian and the Roman—were in England fused at a much later date, in respect both to time and to national development. In France and Spain this fusion took place in the sixth century, while the Teutonic element was still rude and chaotic, and the civilization which it overwhelmed still retained a considerable degree of vigor : and naturally the barbarians were powerfully influenced by the more cultivated communities which they conquered. In Germany it did not occur until the ninth century, and there was no mixture of race ; the imperial ideas and organization were imposed upon a purely Teutonic people, who had hardly begun to emerge from barbarism ; here, too, therefore, the form of civilization and government was Roman. In all these countries the majestic forms and imposing memories of the Empire obtained a lasting ascendancy over the primitive free constitution. In England, on the other hand, the Teutonic constitution had perhaps been carried to the fullest development of which it was by itself capable ; and there was then brought in sudden contact with it, not the Roman civilization or pure imperial ideas, but that remarkable set of ideas and institutions which had resulted from the barbarian conquest.

“One effect of that mixture of refined Roman law with primitive barbaric usage which is known to us by the deceptive name of feudalism was to revive many features of archaic jurisprudence which had died out of the Roman world, so that the decomposition which had seemed to be over commenced again, and to some extent is still proceeding.” \* That is, the primitive Aryan institutions of ancient Rome had run their full course, culminating at last in imperialism ; and now this fully developed principle was brought in contact with another set of cognate primitive institutions which were just commencing their development. Necessarily, therefore, feudalism, as well as the purely Teutonic institutions of England noticed above, finds many analogies in the early usages which Rome had long outgrown. Our plan does not require us to enter into these points, which Mr. Maine has discussed so fully ; what concerns us is the effect upon the English constitution of this sudden and forced contact with feudality.

It is customary to say that the Norman Conquest introduced feudalism into England. This Mr. Freeman, with Sir Francis Palgrave, denies. “The most important of the formal changes in legislation, in language, in the system of government, and in the tenure of land,” he says (p. 4), “were no immediate consequences of the conquest, no mere innovations of the reign of William. They were the developments of a later age, when the Norman as well as the Englishman found himself under the yoke of a foreign master. The distinct changes in law and government which we commonly attribute to William the Norman belong, in truth, in by far the greatest number of cases, to his great-grandson, Henry the Angevin.” We must wait for his later volumes in order to get Mr. Freeman’s reasons for this view ; meanwhile, it may be that the question of the technical establishment of feudalism is in great measure one of definitions. Indeed, he pertinently asks (p. 97), “Did the feudal system ever exist anywhere ?” — meaning by this, no doubt, that the very essence of feudalism is lack of system. Feudal elements he shows to have existed before the Conquest, in the usage of “*thegnhood*” and the occasional military tenure of land. “The Norman conquest no doubt

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\* Maine’s *Ancient Law*, p. 130.

strongly tended to promote the further development of the feudal element ; but, as in every other case, it only opened and prepared the way for further changes.”

Leaving this question aside, for the present, there still remain most potent influences of the Norman conquest upon the English constitution, which we cannot better describe than in Mr. Freeman's own words, in the Introduction : —

“ The Norman conquest is something which stands without a parallel in any other Teutonic land. If that conquest be only looked on in its true light, it is impossible to exaggerate its importance. And yet there is no event whose true nature has been more commonly and more utterly mistaken. No event is less fitted to be taken, as it too often has been taken, for the beginning of our national history. For its whole importance is not the importance which belongs to a beginning, but the importance which belongs to a turning-point. The Norman conquest brought with it a most extensive foreign infusion, which affected our blood, our language, our laws, our arts ; still it was only an infusion ; the older and stronger elements still survived, and in the long run they again made good their supremacy. So far from being the beginning of our national history, the Norman conquest was the temporary overthrow of our national being. But it was only a temporary overthrow. . . . The whole importance of the Norman conquest consists in the effect which it had on an existing nation, humbled indeed, but neither wiped out nor utterly enslaved, in the changes which it wrought in an existing constitution, which was by degrees greatly modified, but which was never wholly abolished or wholly trampled under foot. William, king of the English, claimed to reign as the lawful successor of the kings of the English who reigned before him. He claimed to inherit their rights, and he professed to govern according to their laws. . . .

“ The Norman conquest, again, is an event which stands by itself in the history of Europe. It took place at a transitional period in the world's development. Those elements, Roman and Teutonic, imperial and ecclesiastical, which stood as it were side by side in the system of the early middle age, were then being fused together into the later system of feudal, papal, crusading Europe. The Conquest itself was one of the most important steps in the change. A kingdom which had hitherto been purely Teutonic was brought within the sphere of the laws, the manners, the speech of the Romance nations.” — Vol. I. pp. 1 – 3.

Again in the Preface, he says of his view of the nature of the Conquest:—

“That view, I may say, is formed by uniting the views of the two most eminent writers who have dealt with the subject, Augustine Thierry and Sir Francis Palgrave. . . . Each of these great writers must stand charged with considerable exaggeration on his own side of the question. Still, in the main, I think we may say that each is right in what he asserts, and wrong only in what he leaves out of sight. From one point of view the Norman conquest was nearly all that Thierry says that it was; from another point of view, it was hardly more than Sir Francis Palgrave says that it was.”—p. vi.

In comparing the Norman conquest with the three earlier conquests of the island, the earliest, that by the Romans, may be left out of consideration, for the reason that, although it was far from being without influence upon the subsequent fortunes of the island, this influence was only indirect. The Romans withdrew from Britain, leaving civilization and Christianity behind them. The Jutes, Saxons, and Angles came in their place, but not merely to conquer; the Britons as a race were exterminated, their religion and culture annihilated; and a century and a half after the Romans left the island, it was in the possession of savage, unlettered heathen. This was the English, or Anglo-Saxon, conquest. In those distant, half-mythical times we need not concern ourselves with the details of this Conquest further than to remember that, in Mr. Freeman's words, “in the course of the fifth and sixth centuries, a succession of tribes of kindred origin, all of the same Low-Dutch stock, and speaking essentially the same Low-Dutch language, landed at various points of the British coast, gradually forced their way inland, and founded permanent Teutonic kingdoms.” They were isolated tribes at first, headed by *Ealdormen*; in time tribes united into nations, the ealdormen became kings; and because seven of these kingdoms attained a considerable degree of power and permanence, we know this first, disunited stage of English nationality as the *Heptarchy*. Of these seven kingdoms only three reached a high degree of power, and seriously disputed with one another the *hegemony*, as we may call it, of the Heptarchy. In the seventh century Northumbria, in the eighth Mercia, seemed on the point of grasping

dominion over the whole ; but at last Wessex outstripped them both. It is easy to see why these three were the strong powers in England. Essex, Sussex, and Kent were necessarily circumscribed within their original narrow territories and were short-lived ; East Anglia, though more extensive than these, was equally cut off from growth ; but Wessex, Mercia, and Northumbria, being all border lands, had no check to their aggressions and conquests against Welsh and Scotch, and to these three growth was a law of nature.

Of the three kindred races who thus founded the English Heptarchy Mr. Freeman observes, that “ to the united nation the Angle had given his name, the Saxon had given his royal dynasty ; the Jute, the least considerable in the extent of his territorial possession, had been, according to all tradition, the first to lead the way to a permanent settlement.” Why the Angle gave his name to the united nation, rather than the Saxon who united it, is at first sight puzzling, but is after all not hard to explain. For the Angles fill a much more important place in early history ; it was during the period of the Heptarchy that the name “ English ” became established, and this period is mostly made up of contentions between the two great Anglian monarchies of Mercia and Northumbria. It was not until Mercia seemed at last within reach of supreme dominion, under the great Offa and his son, that Wessex of a sudden sprang to greatness, and made even Mercia and Northumbria her vassals. So far as appears, therefore, it was merely the accident of the man Egbert, which decided that all England should be united under the royal house of Wessex rather than that of Mercia ; and England had come to know herself as the *land of the Angles* during the long period of Anglian predominance. *Saxon*, on the other hand, as Mr. Freeman observes, was the name by which the native Britons, as well as the Scotch, knew the united people, because it was the Saxon invaders that they became first acquainted with on any large scale, and this name had thus become established among the Welsh as the name of their foes, long before the Anglian invasions began.

To the Saxons and Angles — for the Jutes of Kent may be neglected — were soon added a third kindred race, the Danes, who occupied much of the North of England, as a nationality,



and who for a season founded a royal dynasty. In the Anglo-Saxon and Danish conquests of the island, Mr. Freeman points out a certain degree of analogy, in that each passed through the two stages of occasional *plundering expeditions* and of *permanent settlements*; the Danish invasions in time passed to a third stage, that of *political conquest*, when the house of Gorm the Old supplanted that of Cerdic for a few years. Of course there was no political conquest of Britain by the Angles and Saxons, for they exterminated the nation which they found upon the soil, and destroyed or at least expelled its government; so that they founded a new state in place of making themselves masters of one that already existed. The Danish invasions, which began even before the time of Egbert, were suspended for a while during the reigns of his great successors. There was little temptation to harry a realm ruled by Athelstane or Edgar. Since England, therefore, was no longer a safe point of attack, the Danes, or Normans, carried their energies to the coasts of the Continent, where a weak and disorganized government gave them assurance of rich plunder and little danger. The grant of Normandy to Rollo, in 914, was about twenty-five years after the Peace of Wedmore, between Alfred and Guthrum. But when the line of great sovereigns was at an end, and the inglorious Ethelred occupied the throne of "Glorious Athelstane," the Danes reappeared, and were not long in overthrowing the reigning dynasty and establishing a new one in the same government. Cnut, Harold, and Harthacnut were Danish kings of England, not founders of a new realm, like Cerdic, Ella, and Ida. The Norman conquest differs from both English and Danish, in belonging exclusively to the third stage: it was a political conquest of an established nation by an organized government, and resulted (nominally, at least) in nothing but a change of dynasty. This difference in character of the three conquests results not merely from the altered condition of the conquered country, but from the difference in political development of the three conquering nations. The Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, who plundered and settled in the fifth century, were pure barbarians and heathens; and their war against the Christian Celts whom they found occupying the country was one of extermination. One race displaced another. The

Danish conquest, on the other hand, was precisely analogous to the invasion of Gaul by the Franks and Burgundians, except in the important fact that the Danes and English were of the same race. A heathen horde precipitated itself upon a Christian country, harried it, and at last occupied it; but instead of displacing the former possessors, the invaders united with them and soon assimilated with them. The conquerors were themselves conquered; like the Franks and Visigoths, they adopted the language, religion, and institutions of their enemies, and the Danish Cnut was one of the most English of kings. But the Normans were themselves civilized and Christian; they did not exterminate, like the Angles and Saxons, nor become merged with the existing nation, like the Danes. Their conquest was subjugation.

The continuousness of English history is, as we have seen, the fundamental idea of Mr. Freeman's work. From the days of Cerdic, he claims, till now, it has been one nation, which has had a steady development and a constant tendency to unity, hardly interrupted by the Norman conquest, and not interrupted at all by the Danish conquest. He lays more stress, therefore, than we see reason for doing upon the seven *Bretwaldas*, or *wielders of Britain*, given by the Chronicles; these he thinks must have possessed some distinct and acknowledged rank, although he acknowledges that it is hard to see why the names of Ethelbald and Offa, the powerful kings of the eighth century, should be omitted. For our part, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Hallam and attribute less importance to these *Bretwaldas* than Mr. Freeman does. Certainly a list that omits Offa can have no real importance. We should be inclined to suspect that the sacredness of the number seven was the reason that only seven names are given before Egbert.

But however it may have been with Ella, Ceawlin, and Ethelbert, after the Heptarchy came real "*Bretwaldas*," — the great kings of the tenth century. And here we shall be more ready to agree with Mr. Freeman, in his view of the imperial nature of the English monarchy, resting on the successive conquests of the English kingdoms, and the voluntary or involuntary submission of the several Celtic kingdoms to the most potent prince of the island. Athelstane, Edmund, and Edgar were, he holds,

not merely kings of England, they were *emperors of Britain*, having the Celtic Princes of Wales, Strathclyde, and Scotland as *under-kings* or vassals. The establishment of this imperial rule was gradual. Egbert and Alfred exercised a doubtful and disputed sway over all the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. Edward the Elder finally overthrew the nationality of Mercia, and incorporated it with his kingdom of Wessex, as his ancestors had done with Essex and Sussex; further, he received the homage of all the other states of Britain. "The Princes of Wales, Northumberland, Strathclyde, and Scotland, all submitted to him by a voluntary act; 'they chose him to father and to lord.'" Under Athelstane another step was taken; Northumberland was united with Wessex and Mercia into the kingdom of England,—the other states of the Heptarchy had been long since swallowed up,—while the sovereignty over the Celtic kingdoms still continued, and indeed was never formally suspended after this time, but formed the basis of the claim of Edward I., in 1291.

In view of the imperial character thus ascribed to the English crown, the high-sounding titles assumed by the kings of England are vindicated, but not as Hallam says (Vol. II. p. 362), because these monarchs "prefer to the name of a king, which was associated in all the Germanic nations with a limited power, the more indefinite appellations of *imperator* and *basileus*." They were satisfied with limited power; they were constitutional kings, ruling by consent of the nation, and with the aid of the Witan. But "such titles," says Mr. Freeman (Vol. I. p. 128), "were not assumed at random." His view of the precise nature of these imperial titles, the arguments for which we will not stay to discuss, is well stated:—

"My own belief, briefly to sum it up, is that vanity and the love of sounding titles may well have had some secondary share in the matter, but yet that these titles were seriously meant as a distinct assertion of the imperial position of the English crown. But I do not believe that there was the least thought of any succession from the ancient provincial emperors [Carausius, etc.], or from any phantom of imperial sovereignty which may have lingered on among the Welsh at the time of the English conquest or afterwards. I believe that these titles were assumed in order at once to claim for the English crown an absolute

independence of the Roman Empire, and to assert its right to the same sort of superiority over all the princes of Britain as the Emperor exercised, or claimed to exercise, over all the princes of the Continent." — Vol. I. p. 146.

He continues : —

"The imperial titles last in common use down to the Norman conquest ; after that their employment is rare, and they gradually die out altogether. And why ? Because the Norman and Angevin kings, though by no means disposed willingly to abate a tittle of the rights of their predecessors within the four seas of Britain, were far from looking on insular dominion as the main object of their policy. They were kings of England, and they knew the strength and value of England ; still they valued England mainly as a nursery of men and a storehouse of money to serve their projects of Continental ambition. Primarily they were Counts of Anjou, Dukes of Normandy and Aquitaine, striving after an equality with, perhaps a superiority over, their own liege lord at Paris. The British Empire in which Æthelstan gloried, and in which Cnut, in the midst of his Northern triumphs, gloried hardly less, was something which seemed hardly worth keeping in the eyes of Richard and was something which could hardly be kept in the feeble grasp of John and Henry the Third. At last, in the great Edward, there again arose a true Bretwalda, one who saw that the dominion of Æthelstan and Edgar was a worthier prize than shadowy dreams of aggrandizement beyond the sea." — Vol. I. p. 159.

At this point Mr. Freeman clears up a confusion which exists in most minds in regard to the Scottish question, arising from "inattention to historical geography." What is now Scotland consists of three distinct parts, — Scotland proper (the Highlands), purely Celtic ; the southwestern counties, also Celtic in the main, forming originally a part of the kingdom of Strathclyde ; and Lothian, purely English, a part of the kingdom of Northumberland. The Celtic king of Scotland proper "commended" himself to Edward the Elder, A. D. 924. Cumberland, the northern portion of Strathclyde, — including, besides the county of Cumberland, the Scotch counties of Dumfries, Ayrshire, etc., — was conquered by King Edmund, and granted by him as a fief to Malcolm, king of the Scots, A. D. 945. Lothian, an integral portion of England, was granted in the same way by Edgar or Cnut to the Scottish king. There was,

therefore, properly no question whatever as to the sovereignty of England over all of Scotland south of the Forth and Clyde. Northern Scotland, on the other hand, was never *subject* to England, was never *granted* by an English king as a fief; “but Constantine [king of Scotland] and his people, by their own act [the ‘commendation’ to Edward the Elder], put themselves in the same position as if it had been so granted.” (p. 137.)

It resulted from these grants that Scotland was by degrees transformed from a Celtic to a Teutonic monarchy. The wild and sparsely settled Highlands were no match, in importance, for the Lowlands; and naturally enough the kings transferred the seat of their government to what was now the most central and convenient part of their dominions. Edinburgh — Edwin’s borough, founded by the famous Edwin, king of Northumbria — became the capital of the enlarged monarchy; and Lothian, the old English kingdom of Bernicia, became the Scotland of history. Nor was this all. In the eleventh century the dynasty itself became English. Malcolm II., Canmore, after overthrowing Macbeth with the aid of the English Earl Siward, married the sister of Edgar Atheling, the last representative of the direct line of Alfred; and through her not only was the blood of Cerdic transmitted to all the later kings of England, but to the kings of Scotland as well; so that the royal house of Scotland now became half English. And just as after the Conquest the pure English names — with the sole exception of Edward — disappear from the list of kings, and instead of Alfreds, Ethelreds, and Edmunds, we have Williams, Henrys, and Richards, so from this time we see no more of the Scotch names, no more Kenneths, Malcolms, Duncans, and Donalds, but Davids, Alexanders, Roberts, and Jameses.

Consistently with this general principle of the continuousness of English history, Mr. Freeman insists strenuously upon the use of the word “English” for the earliest times, discarding “Saxon” and “Anglo-Saxon.” This practice he has defended in a long Appendix to the first volume, and, so far as the word “Saxon” is concerned, we fully agree with him. The Saxons, we all know, were in the South of England, the

Angles in the North ; and the united people took the name of the more numerous and powerful Angles, rather than that of the Saxons ; although the latter name, as we have said above, is that by which the English were called by their Celtic neighbors. But with regard to the term “ Anglo-Saxon,” matters stand somewhat differently, and our author admits that it was used in that period, not often, to be sure, still often enough to give it authority ; but not, he says, in the sense in which we use it nowadays. “ By ‘ Anglo-Saxons,’ I conceive, in the vulgar use of the word, is meant Saxons who settled in England (meaning, of course, in Britain), as opposed to the Old Saxons who stayed in Germany.” (p. 607.) If this is the “ vulgar use of the word,” we certainly agree with him that it should be at once discarded. But we doubt his correctness in this. For our own part, we have always understood it to be employed in precisely the sense in which he says it was used by Florence of Worcester and King Athelstane. “ ‘ King of the Anglo-Saxons,’ as a title of Æthelstan, or Eadred, meant simply ‘ king of the Angles and Saxons.’ ” It is therefore correct, he proceeds to say, to speak of a king of the Anglo-Saxons, but not of a subject as “ an Anglo-Saxon.” This we admit. We admit, too, that in strictness of speech, “ as a *chronological* term, ‘ Anglo-Saxon ’ is equally objectionable with ‘ Saxon.’ The ‘ Anglo-Saxon period,’ so far as there ever was one, is going on still.” Old-English is undoubtedly the correct term ; still, we doubt whether Anglo-Saxon has not become too firmly established to be uprooted ; and if it is used in its true sense, we do not know that we need quarrel with it, especially as it possesses great convenience.

Even Mr. Freeman tacitly recognizes the broad gulf in English which separates the times before and after the Conquest, by his way of spelling proper names. His arguments for his practice are certainly very strong. The common orthography is, it is true, “ a mere chaos of French and Latin corruptions, following no principle of any kind,” while there is a curious inconsistency in making a special rule for familiar names like Alfred and Edward, while giving the correct form of names like Ealdred and Ælfgar. But, after all, whether consistent or not, we are all familiar with the corruptions Athelstane,

Ethelred, Edwy, and Edith, and we doubt whether anything is gained by insisting upon Æthelstan, Æthelred, Eadwig, and Eadgyth. It certainly has the effect of breaking the continuity, which he is so justly solicitous to preserve.

This Teutonic England, peaceful, prosperous, free, was separated only by the narrow channel from a land of a totally different character. The Normans were, it is true, 'cousins of the English, both of them dwellers in a land which they had conquered; but while the English had retained and developed their Teutonic institutions, hardly affected in any material degree by outside influences, the Normans had become completely Romanized. The language of the English was purely Teutonic; their names were, without exception, native; while the Normans spoke French, and their chief, Rolf, took the French name Robert. But these were slight points of difference. The essential contrast was in the fact that the Normans had become thoroughly permeated with the imperial and feudal ideas which prevailed upon the Continent, the innermost spirit of which was despotism. This was rather a contrast in spirit than in form or admitted powers. The king of France was certainly far weaker than the king of England. Cnut was a true king, while Robert had but a show of authority; and yet Cnut's was an *imperium legitimum*, a power defined by laws, while Robert was of right a monarch. The earls of England even were not inferior to the dukes of France in the essentials of power. Siward of Northumberland and Leofric of Mercia were as mighty potentates as Baldwin of Flanders or William of Aquitaine; but Siward and Leofric ruled over free Englishmen, while Baldwin and William lorded it over serfs.

We are perhaps too prone to look merely at the form of feudalism, to analyze it as a question of antiquities, and define it as consisting in such and such institutions and usages. So far as it goes, this method is correct. Feudalism, properly so called, did consist in special forms and customs; and as these forms did not exist in England to their full extent before the conquest, feudalism did not exist there. But, after all, a more potent reason why it did not exist in England is because the spirit which underlies it was not at home there. For the

spirit of feudalism is even more essential than its forms. Its forms grew out of the peculiar relation which the Germanic nobility sustained to king, commons, and land ; its spirit was a bequest from the last centuries of the Roman Empire, when the traditions of Roman liberty had wholly vanished in the presence of a despotism Oriental in its nature. The empire of Constantine and his successors has been aptly termed a *sultanate* ; in its presence all sense of popular liberties was lost, and all legitimate power was attributed to the master. It is not necessary here to trace the history of this imperial idea, which has had such momentous consequences in the later fortunes of Europe. It is enough here to indicate the transformation of the free companions of Clovis, Alaric, and Theodoric, leaders of the freemen of their own race, into the feudal aristocracy, lords over serfs and villains. The essential point in this transformation is, that the idea of absolutism was transferred, as it were, to the barons ; when the supreme power was split up among a multitude of feudal nobles, these nobles could not, to be sure, conceive themselves as the possessors of imperial power, but towards their subjects they had become imbued in full degree with the notions of imperial prerogative and of the nothingness of the commonalty. With this new type of aristocracy, goodness consists in condescension, not in a recognition of common humanity ; and the revolt of the peasants of Normandy in 997, mercilessly crushed by Richard the " Good," was at once a protest against the new order of things and a commentary on its character.

Feudalism, then, as we find it fully developed in the eleventh century, was not merely the rule of a landed aristocracy, even graded and hereditary, but of a haughty, supercilious aristocracy, who had forgotten their own origin, and fancied themselves beings of a different order from their vassals. The Church, equally arrogant, found itself the best friend and ally of feudalism. When we ask, therefore, whether the Conquest introduced feudalism into England, we must look at the question from the two points of view. As Mr. Freeman says, elements of feudalism existed in England long before the Conquest ; the personal relation of commendation and *thegnhood*, and the reciprocal relation of tenure of land by military ser-



vice, both existed in England ; and these — with subinfeudation and the quality of inheritance — are the essential features of feudality. He says, further, that these elements were not formally developed into the *feudal system* until the reign of Henry of Anjou ; and here again no doubt he is right. But how of the time between the Conquest and the Plantagenets ? If the feudal system did not exist, no more did the old Teutonic constitution of England continue in force. The truth is, that with all the elements of feudality existing, the feudal system as such could not have been developed in England so long as the spirit of English liberties inspired the nation. The chief result of the Conquest was, not a change of form, but an entire and immediate change of spirit ; an infusion into the English institutions of just what was needed to develop feudalism. William perhaps wished to be a lawful king of England, as Cnut, another conqueror, had been. But he did not know how. He did not understand the nation that he came to govern, and, with the best will in the world, could not prevent the change from a free Teutonic monarchy to a monarchy of the imperial type ; while his barons again, in spite of their English titles, could not be English earls, but at once set themselves — perhaps without meaning it — to transform English institutions after the model of those of France. This work was completed during the reigns of the Norman kings, and England thus made ready for the formal changes of Henry II.

This, then, was the effect of the Norman conquest upon England itself ; the overthrow, at least for a season, of a noble structure of political liberty, by the rude hands of ignorant and arrogant barons, and the transformation of a purely Teutonic kingdom into a kingdom of the Continental type, ruled by ignorant, feudal, and ecclesiastical ideas. It is perhaps idle to ask whether this was on the whole a misfortune or not. It is certain that English liberties were not rooted up ; they were won back again in the thirteenth century by the descendants of these very barons who now trampled them under foot, and were afterwards developed in a steady, healthy growth, unexampled among the nations of the Continent. The Conquest was only partial ; despotism ruled only

for a time, while the native spirit of the nation was gathering strength for a new contest. It was not, therefore, a permanent evil. Nay, it may be that it was not an evil at all, except to those immediately affected by it. There were in England before the Conquest elements of disintegration, a laxness and rudeness of organization, which were in fact the cause of the nation's overthrow; it could not stand against the stern discipline and compact and organized power of the Normans. To attain the highest greatness of which she was capable, this vigorous but crude nation needed another element, which she found in her Norman conquerors.

The English people must, no doubt, have passed through the same stages of political development with the rest of Europe. High as they stood in the eleventh century, in regard to political capacity, they were hardly ready for a definitive organization of their several elements. Monarchy, aristocracy, municipal life, ecclesiasticism, must all run their course independently of each other, before they could be fused into one nationality. Perhaps, then, it is fortunate that the feudal and monarchical principles were represented in England by the most wonderful race in Europe for concentrated energy and power. Whatever may have been the cause, these Romanized Northmen surpassed all their contemporaries in the qualities of greatness. England already possessed all the elements of freedom; with the Norman conquest she acquired also the elements of power; Anglo-Saxon liberties, a Norman nobility, Norman blood in the sovereigns,—these were the best materials out of which to fashion the glorious England of the seventeenth century. But, on the other hand, while England owes much of her political greatness to the conquering stock, it would seem none the less true that her social weakness is largely due to this same Conquest. Undoubtedly the various elements of society have failed to be fused in England as they have been in Germany and France. The antagonisms of class are much more violent; with all the national pride and sense of honor, she has, after all, no *nationality* like that of France, or even that of inglorious, disunited Germany. This social weakness of England, no less than her political vigor, she owes to her Norman nobility, however largely recruited from Anglo-Saxon ranks.

As a European event, the Norman conquest was hardly less momentous than in its relations to England itself. And that not merely by extending the European system over a new nation, nor by the long train of wars and contentions between England and France which sprang indirectly from this event, but because it was the first great act in the new life of Europe that was just beginning, great in its effects as well as in itself. Mediæval Europe was the work of two men, Otho the Great and Gregory VII. ; or, if we deny the historic influence of great men, and hold to the irresistible development of events, this development took place in a peculiar degree at two periods, the middle of the tenth and the close of the eleventh century, which are represented by these two men. For Charlemagne, a greater man than either of them, could only prepare the way for these,— could only sketch a scheme which Otho carried out, so far as it was in any way practicable. The Saxon emperors, Henry the Fowler and Otho the Great, brought order out of the anarchy into which the world had fallen after the death of Charlemagne, secured Christian Europe against the heathen Slaves and Hungarians, and founded that great temporal power which was, it is true, overthrown three centuries later when it had done its work, but which, for a season, was the chief guaranty for the order of Europe.

For a hundred years the empire grew in strength and majesty, reaching its culmination under the great Henry III. And to appreciate the debt of gratitude which Europe owes to this early empire, we have only to look at the disastrous condition of France at this time, where feudalism was triumphant, where the nation, indeed, hardly existed at all. The strong arm of the Othos and Henrys preserved Germany and Italy from this. But then, when the temporal power had reached its height, and had itself restored purity and dignity to the Church, a greater man than either Otho I. or Henry III. began the contest which only ended in the complete overthrow of the empire. Of this great struggle of two centuries, the central event of mediæval history, the Normans were the first instruments of the Popes, as the Angevins were the instruments of their final triumph. Leo IX., under whom the papacy began its new life, made the Norman Robert Guiscard his

faithful vassal, and the Norman dynasty of Naples and Sicily was at once the nearest and truest supporter of the papal see; while the Norman William the Bastard entered into a similar partnership with Alexander II.,—Hildebrand being the leading spirit in the counsels of Alexander as well as of Leo.

Mr. Freeman, in his third volume, shows with great clearness and force the relation between William and the papal see, and the importance which the Norman conquest possesses in the career of the papacy. It will be remembered that the English Church had never come so completely under the sway of Rome as the Church of the Continental nations. England was distant and insulated, and the same popular rights that existed in political affairs were also maintained in some degree in ecclesiastical affairs. Neither did there seem much reason to pay homage and submission to such Popes as wore the tiara during the tenth century and the first half of the eleventh. England controlled her own Church just as she did after the time of Henry VIII., just as all nations did before the ninth century. But to the Normans, faithful sons of the mother Church, this was one of the English usages which was least understood and caused most scandal. When the Norman favorites of Edward the Confessor were expelled in the popular uprising after the return of Godwine in 1052, Robert of Jumièges, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Ulf, Bishop of Dorchester, were obliged to flee; their sees were declared vacant, and were filled with Englishmen. "That the king and his Witan," says Mr. Freeman, "would be stepping beyond their powers in filling these sees was not likely to come into any man's head. . . . What the king and his Witan gave, the king and his Witan could doubtless take away, and they accordingly proceeded to deal with the sees of the outlawed bishops exactly as they could have dealt with the earldoms of outlawed earls." At any earlier period of history it would have ended here; never before would the Roman bishop have refused to recognize ecclesiastics thus appointed. But this was just at the turning-point of church history,—the pontificate of Leo IX., the beginning of the career of Gregory VII. Stigand, the newly appointed primate, was never acknowl-

edged by the Pope, was refused his pallium, and was degraded at the first opportunity. But this was a small matter. England herself was put under the ban of the Church, and the Norman invasion had for an object no less to maintain the canons of the Church against an insubordinate nation, than to enforce a claim to the throne, which might have been respected on the Continent, but had absolutely no authority in England, whether on hereditary grounds or as resting upon Edward's gift.

When William preferred his claim to the crown of England, and submitted the decision to Pope Alexander II., this gave precisely the opportunity desired by the great man who ruled the Pope, and furnished a precedent which he was not slow to turn to account and develop even further, when he became Pope himself. We need not question the sincerity of any one of the three parties concerned. William, a reverent follower of the Pope, admitted no doubt his right to adjudicate on a disputed succession, far as he would have been from admitting the claim into which this grew, of disposing of thrones at his will. Harold, a lawfully elected king of England, in every respect a representative of the institutions of his native land, justly spurned the proposal of submitting a question of purely English law to the decision of a foreign ecclesiastic. Hildebrand on his part eagerly grasped the opportunity for controlling temporal powers; but probably he neither understood nor appreciated the real nature of Harold's claim. To him he seemed nothing but a usurper, because he did not belong to the royal family; and as between the two, Hildebrand honestly believed William's shadow of hereditary right a better title than any that Harold could put in.

It would have been hard, in the middle of the eleventh century, to forecast the future of the three great nations of Europe. It would have seemed that Germany, then held firmly in the strong grasp of Henry III., was to develop into a vigorous and united monarchy, rather than France, which, under the nominal rule of Henry I., was nothing but a congeries of dis-united provinces. Even England, free as it was, seemed likely, under such earls as Siward and Godwin, and showing such a sense of provincial independence as is illustrated by Tostig's

insurrection, to fall to pieces again rather than to unite. Indeed, but for the powerful influence of the Norman conquest, it may be doubted whether the centrifugal tendencies would not have proved too strong to be resisted. To the Normans, perhaps, quite as much as to the native English, England owes that wonderful constitution which has secured at once unity of the whole and vigor of the parts, — almost the only constitution of modern Europe which has been able for any length of time to combine strength and liberty.

So far as Mr. Freeman's work extends, it leaves little to be desired either in the narration of events or the discussion of their significance and bearings. We shall look with interest for his succeeding volumes, to find described as graphically and vigorously the measures by which the conquered nation was held in subjection, the process by which feudal institutions became established in England, and finally the growth of a new political system, nobler than that which had been overthrown, because stronger and no less free.

W. F. ALLEN.

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ART. VII. — *Paris en Décembre, 1851. Étude Historique sur Le Coup d'État.* Par EUGÈNE TÉNOT. Paris. 1868.

THE book which forms the subject of this article was published early in the autumn of 1868, and had, in the following December, reached its eleventh edition. The aim of M. Ténot is sufficiently manifest from the date of his Preface, July 14, 1868, for the 14th of July is the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille. Of M. Ténot himself there is very little to be said. He is a Parisian journalist of reputation, and one of the editors of the *Siècle*, — that is to say, a Republican. In 1865 he published a book on the *Coup d'État en Province*, which was very favorably received, and he has been urged and induced to follow it up by a study of the *Coup d'État* in Paris, a much more arduous task, from the difficulty of getting at the truth "through the mire of calumnies, falsehoods, dis-